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ROSENFIELD V. WILKINS
The Criminal Justice Act of 19641 (CJA) provides appointed counsel to
indigent defendants accused or convicted of certain federal crimes and governs
payment of private attorneys who accept such appointments.2 The CJA requires
the government to compensate appointed attorneys for time reasonably expended
and allows the government to reimburse the attorneys for costs and expenses
3reasonably incurred. At the close of representation, the attorney may submit a
claim for compensation and reimbursement to each court in which the attorney
appeared on behalf of the client.4 Each court that receives a claim ultimately
determines the compensation that the government will pay.
5
In response to the CJA's requirement that all federal courts implement the
67CJA, the Judicial Conference of the United States7 publishes guidelines for the
8creation and maintenance of plans to implement the CJA. The Fourth Circuit's
judicial council has used the guidelines to develop a plan for implementing the
CJA (CJA Plan).9 Under the CJA Plan, counsel must "submit a voucher for
compensation and reimbursement" to the Clerk of Court within sixty days of the
final disposition of the case.10 The Clerk of Court initially determines the amount
to be paid, but it is the chief judge who ultimately approves that amount by
signing the voucher and forwarding it to the court's Administrative Office for
payment. 1
The CJA is silent as to the availability of judicial review of the
compensation determination.12 Likewise, for many years the Fourth Circuit did
not provide for judicial review of the determination of CJA attorneys' fee
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006).
2. See id. § 3006A(a)-(d).
3. Id. § 3006A(d)(1).
4. See id. § 3006A(d)(5).
5. See id.
6. See id. § 3006A(a).
7. The Judicial Conference is a body of judges whose "fundamental purpose... is to make
policy with regard to the administration of the U.S. courts." Judicial Conference of the United
States, http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf.html (last visited May 17, 2009). The Judicial Conference
comprises the Chief Justice of the United States, "the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief
judge of the Court of International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit" who meet
annually to make such decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
8. Rosenfield v. Wilkins, 280 F. App'x 275, 277 (4th Cir. 2008).
9. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, PLAN OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1
(2008), available at http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/pdf/CJAPlan.pdf [hereinafter CJA PLAN]. The
Fourth Circuit recognizes that "the 'judicial council' in each circuit is a policy-making body
responsible for 'mak[ing] all necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious
administration of justice within its circuit."' Rosenfield, 280 F. App'x at 277 n.3 (alteration in
original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (2006)). Each federal circuit has a judicial council, which
consists of the circuit's chief judge "and an equal number of circuit judges and district judges of the
circuit." 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1).
10. CJA PLAN, supra note 9, pt. VI(1), at 7.
11. Id.
12. See Rosenfield, 280 F. App'x at 278.
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payments.13 However, in March 2006, the Judicial Conference approved a CJA
guideline requiring that "'[i]f the court determines that a claim should be
reduced, appointed counsel should be provided (a) prior notice of the proposed
reduction with a brief statement of the reason(s) for it, and (b) an opportunity to
address the matter. ' ' 14 This language simultaneously became part of the CJA
Plan for the Fourth Circuit. 
15
In Rosenfield v. Wilkins,16 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that former Chief Judge William W. Wilkins had not violated the
procedural due process rights of a private, court-appointed attorney when he
reduced the attorney's CJA fee award without explanation or an opportunity for
the attorney to appeal the reduction.17 However, during the pendency of the case,
the court's administrative machinery provided guidance for attorneys seeking
review of court-reduced CJA fee awards in the future. 18
The Fourth Circuit appointed Steven Rosenfield to represent an indigent
death row inmate from Virginia in federal habeas corpus petitions on appeal
before the Fourth Circuit as well as in a clemency petition to the Governor of
Virginia.19 After concluding the representation in 2003, Rosenfield submitted a
voucher to the Fourth Circuit's clerk requesting compensation of $35,456.25, in
accordance with the practice and statutory rates in place at the time. 20 The
Circuit Executive's Office reviewed the voucher, as did the three-judge panel
that heard the appeal of Rosenfield's client.21 That panel then forwarded its
recommendations to Chief Judge Wilkins. 22 The chief judge issued a summary
order approving payment for $10,000.23 Without explanation, the Fourth Circuit
denied Rosenfield's petition for an en banc review of the fee award.
24
In December 2005, Rosenfield sued Chief Judge Wilkins in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, alleging that the Fourth
Circuit's CJA attorney compensation procedures in effect when Rosenfield
submitted his voucher violated his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due
process because the court reduced his compensation below the amount requested
"without (1) an explanation of why the request was not paid in full, (2) notice as
13. See id.
14. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., GUIDELINES FOR
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT AND RELATED STATUTES, 7 GUIDE TO
JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 2.22(E), http://www.uscourts.gov/defenderservices/
Chapter_2.cfm#222 (last visited May 2, 2009)).
15. See CJA PLAN, supra note 9, pt.VII(1), at 9 (providing that the CJA Plan automatically
incorporates the CJA rules adopted by the judicial conference).
16. 280 F. App'x 275 (4th Cir. 2008).
17. Id. at 283-84.
18. Id. at 278 (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 14, § 2.22(E)).
19. Id. at 278.
20. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10)(A) (1988) (repealed 2006)).
21. Id. at 278.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 278-79.
24. Id. at 279.
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to what work would or would not be compensated, and (3) rules or procedures
permitting a lawyer to seek review of the amount awarded."25 Rosenfield sought
an injunction requiring the Fourth Circuit to implement procedural safeguards
like those adopted by the Judicial Conference. Rosenfield also asked for
reconsideration of his voucher under these new procedures.
26
Chief Judge James B. Loken of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit accepted an intercircuit assignment to act as the district court
judge.27 Chief Judge Wilkins moved for dismissal, argung that Rosenfield failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted
the motion, finding that because Rosenfield did not have a property right to the
specific amount of attorneys' fees he requested, he had no due process cause of
action.29 Rosenfield appealed the dismissal to the Fourth Circuit.
3
0
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the ground that Rosenfield's
demand for prospective injunctive relief was moot,31 thus avoiding the question
of whether the CJA creates a property interest in compensation for appointed
attorneys. 32 Judge Allyson Duncan, writing for a unanimous panel, summarized
Rosenfield's suit as a complaint that the Fourth Circuit did not "publish[]
standards governing fee awards" or provide "rules or procedures for seeking an
explanation of the reasons for the amount awarded or review of the chief judge's
decision" and as a demand for such notice and review.33 The court found that the
notice and review requirements of section 2.22(e) of the amended CJA
Guidelines, which the Fourth Circuit's judicial council adopted and incorporated
into the CJA Plan after Rosenfield filed his complaint, satisfied Rosenfield's
demands. 34 The court concluded that a decision on the merits would be
meaningless and dismissed Rosenfield's request for an injunction requiring the




27. Id. The district court judge initially assigned the case, concerned about the possible
impropriety of hearing a case pertaining to a judge who regularly heard appeals from his court,
recused himself. Id.
28. Id.; see Rosenfield v. Wilkins, 468 F. Supp. 2d 806, 809 (W.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 280 F.
App'x 275 (4th Cir. 2008); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing for the dismissal of a
complaint when the allegations do not state a claim for relief).
29. Rosenfield, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 811. Chief Judge Loken stated that the CJA did not create
a protected property interest, indicate an entitlement to the compensation, or meaningfully limit the
Fourth Circuit's discretion in deciding the amount of compensation. See id. at 810-11.
30. Rosenfield, 280 F. App'x at 276.
31. Id. at 282-83.
32. See id. at 283 n.ll.
33. Id. at 282.
34. Id. Interestingly, the court supported this finding in part by relying on Rosenfield's reply
brief, which stated that section 2.22(e) 'could well have been drafted by Rosenfield."' Id. (quoting
Reply Brief of Petitioners-Appellants at 6, Rosenfield v. Wilkins, 280 F. App'x 275 (4th Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-2182)).
35. See id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burke, 897 F.2d 734, 739 (4th Cir. 1990)).
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The court then analyzed Rosenfield's demand for reconsideration of his
voucher according to section 2.22 under the factors of Mathews v. Eldridge,
36
stating that the level of process constitutionally required for a matter "depends
upon (1) the nature of the private interest, (2) the adequacy of the existing
procedure in protecting that interest, and (3) the governmental interest in the
efficient administration of the applicable law." 37 First, even assuming that a
court-appointed CJA attorney has a property interest in compensation, the
interest would be in reasonable compensation as determined by the voucher-
reviewing court, not the amount of compensation requested by the attorney.
38
Second, the purpose of the CJA Plan's explanation requirement is to assist an
attorney in responding to a court's initial fee determination.3 9 Although
Rosenfield never received an explanation for the reduction g0 the court reasoned
that because Rosenfield's requests for rehearing and en banc consideration
featured "extensive[ly] detail[ed]" arguments on the nature of CJA fee awards
and due process rights, contemporaneous explanation of the reduction would not
have protected his constitutional interests any more than did his own subsequent
litigation research. 41 Finally, because Rosenfield had already received
notification of his fee reduction and made two substantive challenges to the
reduction, the court concluded that, effectively, Rosenfield had already received
an opportunity to address the chief judge's determination, even though section
2.22(e) was not in effect when Rosenfield filed for attorneys' fees.42 Any
opportunities Rosenfield would have had under section 2.22(e) were not
substantially different from the courses of action that he had already pursued.
43
The Fourth Circuit thus held that Rosenfield had "already received sufficient
process" under the CJA Plan, and accordingly denied his request for
reconsideration."
The overall import of Rosenfield as it relates to the issue of CJA attorneys'
fees is that "CJA attorneys ... will enjoy the procedural protections articulated
in § 2.22 for the able service they provide in [the Fourth Circuit] going
forward." When challenging reductions in compensation, attorneys can
reference Rosenfield for an understanding of their right to appeal, rather than
36. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
37. Rosenfield, 280 F. App'x at 284 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
38. Id. at 284.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 283.
41. See id. at 284.




45. Id. at 282.
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searching the CJA Plan and the CJA Guidelines. 46 Furthermore, the Fourth
Circuit's opinion provides some clarification of section 2.22(e). For example, the
availability of a motion for reconsideration and petition for en banc review
constitutes an adequate opportunity to challenge the reduction. 47 Likewise, the
court found that the chief judge's order provides sufficient notice of the fee
reduction.
48
Unfortunately, Rosenfield left several questions unanswered. The court
avoided answering the underlying question of what constitutes an adequate brief
statement of the reasons for fee reduction by concluding that the court's
statement could not have provided Rosenfield with any more information than he
had already set forth in his brief requesting a rehearing and en banc review.
49
However, if attorneys read Rosenfield's briefs for guidance, his arguments only
provide an example of what might constitute an adequate response to a notice of
reduction in fees-not what actually constitutes notice.
50
Moreover, the court's conclusion implies that if Rosenfield's arguments had
been less detailed or poorly constructed, he may actually have been entitled to
further explanation from Chief Judge Wilkins upon issuance of the fee order.5 1
This self-notification test creates an unworkable standard for both lawyers and
the Fourth Circuit in future award challenges. Attorneys appealing fee denials or
reductions on the basis of failure to follow section 2.22(e) could lose their
appeals by preparing their arguments too well because they provided what
amounts to explanations after the fact; likewise, future chief judges could
arguably have their fee award orders successfully overturned for inadequate
explanation simply because the appealing attorney prepared a poor appeal.
These problems are complicated by the fact that Rosenfield appears to be the
only case addressing this issue in any court within the Fourth Circuit since
adoption of section 2.22(e). Because of the summary nature of both Chief Judge
Wilkins's initial reduction order and the Fourth Circuit's eventual affirmation of
that order, lawyers lack guidance as to what types of expenditures and services
will qualify for payment under the CJA and, more importantly, will be approved
by courts in the Fourth Circuit. Attorneys are not entirely without guidance,
however, as other federal courts have provided some examples. Several opinions
issued after the promulgation of section 2.22(e) reveal a variety of reasons courts
have cited for fee reduction, including spending excessive time on legal
46. Practitioners should note, though, that Rosenfield is merely persuasive authority. 4TH
Cm. R. 32.1 (noting that the Fourth Circuit "disfavor[s]" citations to unpublished opinions issued
prior to 2007).
47. See Rosenfield, 280 F. App'x at 284.
48. See id. at 283.
49. Id. at 284.
50. See Reply Brief of Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 34, at 1-14; Opening Brief of
Petitioners-Appellants at 11-29, Rosenfield v. Wilkins, 280 F. App'x 275 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-
2182).
51. Rosenfield, 280 F. App'x at 284.
2009] 1205
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research,52 case organization,53 drafting,54 or document review;55 overestimating
travel time56 or distance; 57 submitting illegible time sheets; 58 submitting vague
descriptions of work done;59 and including alcohol in food expenses. 6° Likewise,
courts often state their grounds for paying attorneys the full amount requested.61
Using cases like these to fill in the gaps left by section 2.22(e) and Rosenfield,
attorneys in the Fourth Circuit appointed under the CJA can create a framework
of persuasive authority to guide them in their planning of indigent representation
expenditures and in challenging CJA fee award reductions.
The Judicial Conference and the Fourth Circuit adopted section 2.22(e),
which sets forth the very procedures Rosenfield wanted, only after Rosenfield
filed suit against the court itself.62 If the two events are not merely a coincidence,
Rosenfield unofficially marks an improvement in procedural protections for
attorneys in the Fourth Circuit seeking compensation for their services as CJA
defense counsel. If, however, the timing of the amendment to the CJA Plan was
a mere coincidence, Rosenfield still has value as a rough illustration of the
application of section 2.22(e). As for the court's unusual suggestion regarding
the relation of an attorney's arguments on review to the adequacy of notice
previously provided by the court,63 the Fourth Circuit should seek an opportunity
to clarify its conclusions in Rosenfield and provide a clearer example of the CJA
Plan's new requirements for compensating attorneys appointed under the CJA.
Andrew R. deHoll
52. See United States v. Mukhtaar, No. 06 Cr. 31 (SWK), 2008 WL 2151798, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2008); United States v. Sepulveda, 502 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109-10 (D. Mont.
2007).
53. See Sepulveda, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 1109-10.
54. See Mukhtaar, 2008 WL 2151798, at *5; United States v. Jones, No. 06-14049-CR, 2007
WL 3197654, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2007); Sepulveda, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
55. See Jones, 2007 WL 3197654, at *2; Sepulveda, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
56. See United States v. Bernal-Benitez, No. 07-20563-CR, 2008 WL 877216, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 1, 2008); Jones, 2007 WL 3197654, at *2.
57. See Bernal-Benitez, 2008 WL 877216, at *2.
58. See Mukhtaar, 2008 WL 2151798, at *5.
59. See id.
60. See Supelveda, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 (denying attorney's attempt to bill the court for
three bottles of wine).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Villafuerte, No. 07-20563-CR, 2008 WL 2127992, at *2-4
(S.D. Fla. May 20, 2008) (approving full reimbursement for time spent on discovery, legal research,
and client interviews); United States v. Campuzano, No. 06-14035-CR, 2007 WL 2462004, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2007) (approving full reimbursement of a CJA voucher for attorney's fees and
costs).
62. See Reply Brief of Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 34, at 6; see also JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 15-16 (2006) (changing reduction procedures to require notice of reduction, a brief
explanation for the reduction, and the opportunity to address the concerns motivating the reduction);
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
63. Rosenfield v. Wilkins, 280 F. App'x 275, 284 (4th Cir. 2008).
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